1. J. Marr

(drmezmer.com)

ABSTRACT: Molar and molecular changes in the response topography of the musculature are equally the province of behavior analysis, and differ only in their amenability to conscious appraisal. This has resulted in the reference of the molar (grasping, walking, talking) and molecular activity (muscular tension) of the musculature to different causal factors even though those responses are not different in kind. Although the micro-behavioral activity of the musculature or muscular tension has been empirically demonstrated to cohere to operant principles, commonly accepted heuristic models for such activity continue to engage inferred S-R explanations (flight or fight response) that are incoherent with a behavior analytic interpretation, although not with behavior analytic procedure. It is argued that changes in behavior analytic procedure informed by modern neuroscience are necessary to bridge this discrepancy, and to more fully incorporate stress management practice and theory under behavior analytic principles.

Key Words: Coverant, tension, stress, muscular tension, somatic marker

"The human mind is the functioning only of systems of the body. As those systems selectively interact through neuromuscular circuits according to cybernetic principles, they generate cognitive processes (the contents of mind, some of which we can verbally report) and program behavior, both overt and covert, to accomplish our purposes."

Consider a simple mind experiment. On New Year's night, John decides to shoot a skyrocket from his backyard. As he lights the fuse, his muscles tense and are primed to propel him out of trouble, and in a split second he turns and runs away to safety. Being fully in control of the situation, he feels neither panicked nor fearful, and the activity of his gross musculature, namely the act of running, is the major behavior of note. In this situation, it would be absurd to claim that running is an instinctive response to a lit fuse, or that his behavior displays concomitant neuro-physiological responses that are reflective of fear or panic. He simply runs away because he consciously and nonconsciously perceives that is it the proper thing to do. Or in other words, he runs away because his behavior has a functional utility, or 'operates' on his environment.

Now consider another mind experiment. On the next day John returns to work. His working day is, as usual, confronted with myriad choices that determine his successes and pleasures of the day. He may have to decide upon which reports to work on, how and when to work on them, and weigh the different implications of many other workaday decisions. He will also continually decide upon the diversions, from checking email to chatting with coworkers that will provide pleasurable interludes to work, yet nonetheless interfere with the prompt completion of work. The need to make constant choices, or to think, will of course take a toll. Doubtless, he will return home tired and 'stressed out' because of the accumulated tensions during the day.

The similarity of John at play and John at work is that both incur changes in the musculature. These muscular changes may be different in type, as in their molar (as in John running away) or molecular (as in John getting tense) representations, but since they involve the same somatic events, they are not different in kind. However, this does not restrict common assumptions at to the etiology or origin of these changes. In the former case, it would be absurd to say that his behavior is instinctive or that it reflects an emotional 'flight or fight' response. However, in the latter case, the micro-behavioral activity of the musculature is commonly attributed to instinctive or reflexive mechanisms, and is conceptually bound to a host of other concurrent physiological neurological and physiological changes that represents aspects of the 'flight or fight' response, namely fear, anger, or panic.

It is not difficult to see the cause of an attribution of reflexive mechanisms to explain muscular tension, since the micro-behavioral activity of the musculature is often non-consciously perceived and has results that are at best obscurely apparent. However, the development of more powerful tools and methodologies has permitted the observation of the micro-behavioral activity of the musculature as well as the corresponding neural events that initiate, integrate, and are modified by somatic events. These methods have been implemented in over forty years of research that demonstrated unequivocally that the activity of the musculature is critical to thought.

Although investigations of the neuro-physiology of muscular tension derive from numerous researchers, the pivotal work both conceptually and empirically on this topic owes primarily to two individuals: the psychologist F. J. McGuigan and the neurologist Antonio Damasio. McGuigan's (1976,1978,1997) corpus of research focused on the neuro-physiology of muscular tension, whereas Damasio (1994) emphasized in his work the neurology of affect, which included the micro-behavioral aspects of the musculature.

The convergent conclusion derived from the work of both McGuigan and Damasio, or what I call the McGuigan-Damasio hypothesis, is that the micro-behavioral activity of the musculature provides non-conscious information that is perceived linguistically in the brain (or as McGuigan called it, an allographic code). This information enables an individual to choose between alternatives prior to their conscious consideration. In other words, muscular tension occurs to expedite thinking processes by allowing an individual to automatically parse between alternatives and acts to somatically 'mark' choices. It is thus functionally equivalent to a covert operant or coverant behavior (Homme, 1965).

The idea that muscular tension acts as a somatic marker (Damasio) or coverant (McGuigan) to enable thought is in marked contrast to the commonly held view that tension occurs as a reflexive or 'respondent' behavior. Nonetheless, in spite of the overwhelming evidence in favor of the McGuigan-Damasio hypothesis, it continues to be ignored by the overwhelming majority of practitioners of stress management. As I will argue, the reasons are not so much do to prejudice or ignorance as to sheer pragmatism.

Although the empirical and conceptual elegance and power of McGuigan's and Damasio's work has been critically hailed and acknowledged, it ironically (and perhaps shamefully) has not been incorporated into a theoretical foundation for procedures for the control of stress. Our daily stresses are still attributed to instinctive 'flight of fight' mechanisms, with the common inclusion of the hoary cliché of prehistoric ancestors running from mastodons as a rationale for the genetic, reflexive, or hardwired inevitability of our daily tensions.

This conceptualization of muscular tension as being a mere reaction to stressors remains prevalent because it is still conceptually easy for a layman to attribute micro-behavioral nonconscious events to evocative Pavlovian 'stimuli', and also because present procedures do not impel an acceptance of a true bio-behavioral explanation. That is, one can still use stress control procedures without having to make a commitment to or even have an understanding of the true etiology of muscular tension.

Stress management is a pragmatic discipline, and explanations have lower precedence to effective procedures. Indeed, if procedure is not compromised, simple and wrong explanations for stress are to be preferred to more complex and correct alternatives that involve a thorough rooting in the neuro-physiology of learning. Thus, one can believe that stress is a mere unconditioned reaction and still engage in procedures that provide its remedy. However, if procedure requires the adoption of a new explanation, then explanations must radically and rapidly change. As will be demonstrated, the acceptance of correct explanations for stress is dependent on procedure.

Our daily lives represent a surfeit of options, different modes of behaving from which we must continually choose. Generally, we do not deliberate or choose between the vast majority of response options that fill our day. We go to work the same way, do our work and pursue our pleasures the same way, and put our pants on one leg at a time. However, we are continuously faced with equivalent choices that do require us to weigh options rapidly while insuring that our choices remain optimal. When two near equivalent options are consciously or nonconsciously perceived, muscular tension will occur to mark the value of one choice or another, and thus expedite decision.

When options are near equivalent, muscular tension occurs briefly, nonconsciously and effectively to drive choice in the proper direction. However, when options are equivalent, then tension may not only arise, but be sustained and rise to the level of consciousness. This sustained tension is perceived as stress, and begins to impede rather than facilitate choice.

The solution to this harmful not to mention painful aspect of stress is to reduce the likelihood of 'difficult' choices one is forced to make. This may entail acquiring non-conscious information, conscious information, or merely avoiding events that confront us with such choices. Thus, by learning automated behaviors or skills such as driving a car, swimming, etc., we are provided with the nonconscious information that eliminates the stressful choices such behaviors may entail. Similarly, by acquiring conscious information such as using time management procedures, cognitive reframing, psychotherapy etc. we can deliberately order events or reinterpret the informative content of events to eliminate difficult choices. Finally, by avoiding the circumstances that cause stress, whether through wisdom (e.g. deferring a skydiving lesson) of mere procrastination (avoiding the preparation of your income tax) we can eliminate stress by simply avoiding difficult choices.

For all of these procedures, an explanation of stress that reduces muscular tension to a mere reaction to discrete stressors is not obviously incompatible to the procedures themselves. However, this changes if we consider the non-rational choices that must be made between events that have different neurological sources.

When we think of value, we conceive of options that have a rational origin. But this of course is not true, as value is also determined by nativistic or innate sensitivities or drives that are consciously perceived, and by abstract elements of our environment that escape conscious appraisal. For the former, the genesis of muscular tension is easy to conceive. Thus one can easily be frustrated when confronted with a neurochemical source of value (looking at a pretty girl, a ham sandwich, or a glass of beer) and a competing rational source of value (staying faithful to one's wife, keeping to a diet, embarrassing oneself by getting drunk). Oftentimes we can avoid them, but never can we suitably rationalize them, for the simple reason that they represent incommensurate sources of value. However, a core premise in modern learning theory is that abstract elements of our environment also represent an equally powerful and innate source of value. These elements are enfolded under 'discrepancy' theories of reward (Donahoe and Palmer, 1993; Schultz, 1998; Berridge, 2001) or reinforcement that attribute value to novel elements of our environment that represent contrary or discrepant events that were heretofore unpredicted. Discrepant value is embedded in many of the events that we pursue during the day, from watching TV to chatting with friends to accessing our email. By experiencing or merely contemplating the imminent experience with such events (or in other words, 'looking forward' to them), we become aroused and alert, and are tempted to veer from more rational courses of action, like working.

The prevalence of diversions, and the fact that we are often conflicted by them is a major source of tension. Thus to avoid them we do our work in confining areas such as workplaces, and away from places that provide ample distractions (e.g. at home). Nonetheless, we do not absolutely segregate all diversions that may exist, and may attribute rational value to taking time to talk with a friend, check email, and other events. That is, when tired or bored at work we often take the time out to do something rather than nothing. By taking a time out to perform some diversionary act rather than taking a mere time out itself (i.e. resting), we non-consciously set up future choices of a similar nature that are not so rationally justified. In other words, we create future optional choices that we must decide between, and thus become correspondingly tense. So by surrendering to diversions any time during the day, we ironically justify their choice for any time during the day. The resulting preponderance of options thus sets the groundwork for continuous muscular tension or stress. Thus workaday stress may not be as much due to an abundance of demands set upon us by an impersonal world, but rather to an abundance of conflicts that are unintentionally arranged by an individual himself.

The absolute segregation of diverting events to set times of the day will result in a significant reduction of muscular tension because it reduces significantly the conflicting choices one has available during the day. This concept, called radical relaxation, derives directly from the idea that tension derives from difficult or incommensurable choices that may have similar or different sources of neurological value. Reduce the incidence of these choices, and relaxation follows by default. By segregating to set times of the day behaviors that have novel or discrepant value as their primary or sole cause for choice, our behavioral options are reduced to performing rational acts or to do sit and do nothing, or take a time out or rest. Thus by reducing options, we reduce conflicting thought, and by reducing conflicting thought, we reduce the somatic event of muscular tension that occurs to aid us to decide which way to go.

By reducing conflicts of stimuli or 'ideas' rather than such events themselves the cause of muscular tension is referred to cognitive rather than reflexive principles. Relaxation thus is achieved through controlling conflicted thinking, not thinking or perceiving (e.g. paying attention, as in meditation) per se. This new interpretation of muscular tension overturns prevalent thinking in stress research that has reduced tension to simplistic reflexive causes, but more importantly provides a new perspective on stress management procedures, and suggests better and more decisive approaches to stress management that have the saving grace of being easily testable.

Berridge, K. (2001). Reward Learning: Reinforcement, Incentives, and Expectations, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 3, Academic Press, New York

Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. Avon: New York

Donahoe, J.W. & Palmer, D. C. (1993). Learning and Complex Behavior, Needham Heights, Ma. : Allyn and Bacon

Homme, L. E. (1965). Perspective in psychology: XXIV Control of coverants, the operants of the mind. The Psychological Record, 15: pp. 501-511.

McGuigan, F.J. (1976). The function of covert oral behavior in linguistic coding and integral information processing. In Kurt Salzinger (ed.) Psychology in progress: an interim report. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 270, pp. 57-89

McGuigan, F.J. (1978). Cognitive Psychophysiology. Principles of Covert Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall Inc.

McGuigan, F.J. (1997). A Neuromuscular model of mind with clinical and educational applications, Journal of Mind and Behavior, 18(4), pp. 351-370

Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons, Journal of Neurophysiology, 80(1), pp. 1-27